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The Many Facets of Chinese
Nationalism
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
1 Chinese  nationalism is  a  more  ambiguous  reality  than it  might  seem.  Its  existence
cannot be denied. It has great power and intensity, as shown over the last few years by
the demonstrations against the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
in May 1999, the EP3 incident in April 2001, the denunciation of the Japanese Prime
Minister's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the virulent criticisms of Taiwanese leaders,
from Lee Teng-hui to Chen Shui-bian, and, more recently, the ambition to make China
not only a great economic and military power but to surpass the United States as the
greatest power in the world. Nationalism seems today to be the most widely-shared
value both in Chinese society and in the government, which is perfectly aware of this,
and has repeatedly instrumentalised it with the aim of strengthening its hand in the
face  of  its  foreign partners  and also  of  preventing any “peaceful  evolution” of  the
regime towards democracy.
2 Yet at the same time, motivated by self-interest,  many international actions by the
Peking government,  and many expressions of society,  have remained impervious to
this feeling of nationalism. The opening up of the Chinese economy and society to the
outside world, the establishment of diplomatic and trade links with those powers who
had once “humiliated” China (the United States, Japan, Great Britain, Germany, France,
etc.),  Peking's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the acceptance
(provisional, it is true) of a form of status quo in the Taiwan Strait, are evidence of a
certain “bringing under control” of nationalist emotions which can affect government
circles  and  the  intellectual  elite.  Similarly,  within  Chinese  society,  the  pursuit  of
individual success, the desire—and perhaps even more the possibility—to become rich
and to improve one's standard of living,  the increasing power of provincialism and
localism, the fascination with an America which is both powerful and prosperous, the
attraction of a modernity which is often synonymous with the “American way of life”,
as well as a general curiosity about a long forbidden outside world — as shown by the
growth of Chinese tourism abroad — and the emigration of millions of Chinese towards
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the  developed  world,  are  all  evidence,  if  not  of  an  absence,  at  least  of a  relative
weakness of nationalism. This attitude has led a number of writers to put forward the
concept of “pragmatic nationalism”1.
3 Moreover 9/11 and the worldwide war against terrorism have contributed to creating
solidarities  between  Chinese  and  Western  governments,  solidarities  which  have
attenuated,  at  least  up  to  the  spring  of  2005,  the  most  spectacular  and  extreme
manifestations of Chinese nationalism. Finally, the last ten years have brought to light
a spectrum, wider than one might previously have expected, of international behaviour
on  the  part  of  both  Chinese  government  and  society,  putting  into  perspective  the
nature and extent of Chinese nationalism and making it possible to distinguish more
clearly between ordinary times and the brief—but intense and emotional—moments of
more or less spontaneous manifestations of nationalism.
4 While, for historical reasons, Chinese nationalism is in many ways specific, because it is
based  on  what  is  perceived  as  past  humiliation  (xiuru),  it  has  shown  since  the
beginning of the modern era, which is to say since the Opium War of 1840, a profound
feeling  of  insecurity.  However,  beyond  this  feeling  of  insecurity,  several  forms  of
nationalism co-exist in this country, as they do in any other.
5 It  is  first  of  all  an  official  nationalism,  inspired  by  communist  ideology  and  the
preoccupation of the Communist Party (CP) with maintaining its monopoly of politics:
this is synonymous in China with “patriotism”.
6 It is also a “revanchist nationalism” with racist tendencies, which is disseminated in
society by the most xenophobic elements among the Chinese elite—in particular the
“New Left”—which rely on popular ignorance of foreign countries and the traditional
mistrust towards them, to spread their ideas. Based more on the need to wash away
past  humiliations  than  on  a  rational  analysis  of  reality,  influenced  by  communist
patriotism but going beyond it, this form of nationalism was particularly influential in
the second half of the 1990s. Its manifestations more frequently took the form of anti-
foreign  emotions  and  violence  than  of  structured  discourse  or  coherent  action.
Stimulated by the elites close to government circles, it was once again instrumentalised
by the latter in the spring of 2005.
7 One may well wonder if there is not another form of Chinese nationalism, a nationalism
which derives its legitimacy both from cultural specificity and from current Chinese
economic and social realities, without however rejecting foreign influence out of hand.
While seeking to modernise China and to make it regain the place and influence which
are  its  due  in  the  international  community,  while  preserving  its  culture,  this
nationalism seeks to be less aggressive and more peaceable, showing a desire to favour
convergence, in particular political convergence, with the rest of the world. Symbolised
by the concept, favoured by Hu Jintao, of China's “peaceful rise”, can this nationalism
eventually  give  birth  to  a  democratic  nationalism,  at  once  measured,  open,  and
concerned with defending not only the interests of the Chinese nation but also those of
the men and women who belong to it? Is not this nationalism the only one capable of
expressing  a  real  ideological  consensus  in  society,  far  from  the  manipulations  of
political and intellectual elites driven above all by ambition and the struggle for power?
The elitist nationalism of a great power dispossessed and humiliated
8 It is widely accepted that Chinese nationalism took form only as a reaction to the shock
of forced contact with the West, after the Opium War of 1840. It is true that before this
historic  turning-point,  China  was  much  more  an  empire  than  a  Nation  State,  a
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civilisation and a culture dominated by one race (zu)—the Han—rather than a society
brought together by a national project, and even less so by a modern citizenship. This is
why several sinologists have contrasted the old “culturalism” with the nationalism of
the  Chinese  after  18402.  In  fact,  despite  earlier  contacts  with the  outside  world,  in
particular with Russia, it is this emblematic event which truly transformed the Chinese
Empire into a modern State, and China into a Nation, thus confirming the theses of
Ernest  Gellner  and Eric  Hobsbawm on the  decisive  role  played  by  the  state  in  the
construction of the nation and consequently on the formation of nationalism3.
9 However the main specificity of imperial China may lie elsewhere: many non-Western
societies did not have the characteristics of the old European nations (in particular
France and England), while being brought together by clear and specific racial origins,
in short an ethnic or “objective” nationalism, which, in contact with the West, could
only  be  exacerbated.  On  this  last  point,  Japan  and  Korea  come  to  mind—in  the
languages  of  these  countries,  as  in  Chinese,  the  idea  of  nationalism  (minzuzhuyi),
introduced in the nineteenth century includes the idea of race (minzoshugi in Japanese
and minjokchuyi in Korean)4.  These nations therefore also constituted, in their own
ways,  “imagined  communities”,  to  use  Benedict  Anderson's  classic  formulation5.
Moreover, also in the West, “subjective” nationalism, as a feeling and a movement, is a
phenomenon scarcely older than modern Chinese nationalism, brought about directly
by the consolidation of states, the drawing of frontiers and the ideological changes of
the eighteenth century6.
10 The specificity of Chinese nationalism stems from the almost permanently dominant
position occupied by the Chinese Empire within the world with which it maintained
relations prior to 1840. After its fall from the pedestal, the impact of the West was all
the  more  strongly  felt,  the  humiliation  provoked  all  the  more  profound,  China's
resistance to outside ideas all the stronger, causing the failure of numerous reforms at
the end of  the Manchu era,  at  the very moment when Meiji  Japan,  having become
Europe's pupil after having been China's, was modernising on an economic level as well
as in political and institutional matters. We know that Chinese nationalists, and the
Communist Party in particular, continue to accuse Western imperialism of being the
main instigator of these failures, in particular by imposing inequitable treaties on their
country,  whereas  historiography  as  a  whole  has  shown  that  the  weakening  of  the
Empire predated 1840, and was due to a number of internal causes (in particular the
doubling of the population between 1700 and 1800). What is interesting to focus on
here is the foundational dimension of the trauma of 1840 in the debate on Chinese
nationalism. Since then the debate has been between those who favoured resistance to
the West and the partisans of modernisation by the introduction, not only of Western
sciences and techniques,  but also of Western ideas,  modes of organisation (political
institutions and law) and of management.
11 The second specificity we would venture to put forward is the essential role played in
China  by  the  political  and  intellectual  elites  in  the  formation  of  contemporary
nationalism. As both Wilfred Pareto and Roberto Michels have shown, the role played
by the elites in the conceptualisation, manipulation and propagation of this ideology is
universally important. Despite the relevance of the work of both Pierre Birnbaum and
Ezra Suleiman on the elites  in  France,  this  influence tends to  grow as  a  particular
regime moves away from democracy and leans towards authoritarianism. The elitist
character of Asian and especially Confucian societies, for example those of Japan and
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Korea, gives the elites a specific influence in this undertaking. As we shall see, certain
nationalist  movements  which  appeared  in  China  after  1840―the  Taiping  and  the
Boxers—were not entirely the preserve of the “counter-elites” but of social strata who
perceived foreign ascendancy—respectively the Manchu and the Westerners—to be the
source of their problems. The hypothesis we seek to put forward here, however, and
which seems to  be  borne out  in  the  People's  Republic  today,  is  that  of  the  virtual
monopoly exercised by the elites in the formation of nationalism, and the low level of
interaction between them and the rest of society,  which,  structured as it  is  around
personal and family obligations, remains, except in times of major crisis (even in the
case of the Sino-Japanese war) relatively impervious to this ideology, and especially to
its translation into action7. A reflection of the distanced relations between society and
the state in China, this gap is much less obvious elsewhere, particularly in Japan or in
Korea. This specificity favours a more energetic manipulation of nationalism by the
elites, particularly those which have privileged interaction with government.
The diversity of nationalist responses to China's problems
12 The apparent binarism of the choices put forward by the Chinese elites after 1840—
either  resisting  the  West  or  learning  from  it—did  not  lead  to  an  inevitable
monopolisation of nationalism by the detractors of the West. On the contrary, what is
shown by a century and a half of contemporary Chinese history is the great diversity of
discourses and political and economic projects that the country produced. It is enough
to briefly recall the debates among the elites at the end of the Manchu era (1644-1911)
and the way in which these structured the political forces in the republican period
(1912-1949) to be convinced of this.
13 Constrained  against  its  will  to  open  up,  subjected  to  the  regime  of  “inequitable
treaties”, of zones of influence and of foreign concessions, China after 1840—and once
again its elites above all―could not be other than unanimously nationalist and anti-
Western. But at the same time, this nationalism was not turned against the European
powers only: it was also aimed at the “foreign”, which is to say non-Han, power of the
Manchu dynasty, and militated for the restoration of the Ming; as was shown by the
Taiping rebellion (1851-1864), it could both draw inspiration from Western religions, in
this case Christianity, and display profound xenophobia. After the humiliating military
defeat against Japan in 1895,  it  was fuelled by both enduring jealousy towards that
country and a strong determination to learn from it. Above all, nationalist reaction to
Western domination was plural from the beginning.
14 At one end of the spectrum, under the impact of the West and of the “Break-up of
China” in 1898, which is to say the race for concessions, was the formation of a rural
and populist “primitive nationalism” based on an “ethno-cultural awareness” of which
the  Boxers  rebellion  in  1900  was  the  best-known  manifestation8.  This  rebellion,
moulded  by  religions  and  popular  millenarian  beliefs,  consolidated  a  xenophobic
nationalist  tradition,  racist  and  above  all  anti-Western,  as  well  as  anti-Christian.
Sanctified  by  the  Communist  Party,  the  Boxer  movement  experienced  a  certain
extension during the Maoist period, particularly during the Cultural Revolution (even
though  the  Red  Guards,  often  issued  from  the  Nomenklatura,  can  be  considered  a
“counter-elite”,  anxious  to  instrumentalise,  for  uniquely  political  and  personal
purposes,  their  rejection  of  the  outside  world).  Although  the  manifestations  of
nationalism which have appeared since the reopening of  China in 1979 have never
equalled  that  degree  of  fanaticism  and  xenophobia,  one  cannot  bank  on  the
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disappearance of this tradition, particularly among the elites. Indeed, despite a certain
evolution in historiography, not only does the present Chinese government continue to
consider the Boxers as nationalist heroes and to propagate this idea in the country's
school textbooks, but the many who have been pushed aside by economic growth—
while certain sections of the elite like to manipulate them and use them in the service
of their political ambitions—might well in future find in the expatriate population in
China the most obvious scapegoats for their misfortunes.
15 Right next to this movement lies an “instrumentalist” nationalist tradition which has
constantly sought to introduce into China only those “recipes” of the West which are
likely to strengthen the state with the exclusive aim of enabling it better to resist both
domination and ideas from outside. Personified in the nineteenth century by Zhang
Zhidong, whose aim was to adopt only the sciences and techniques of Europe in order
to maintain “Chinese knowledge as substance” (zhongxue wei ti), and by the statesman
Li Hongzhang, this conservative tradition advocated the maintenance of an unalloyed
Confucianism, opposed to any opening to the West. It contributed to the failure of the
prudent reforms of the Hundred Days in 1898, launched by Kang Youwei and Liang
Qichao. It also influenced a number of Chinese reformers and constitutionalists at the
beginning of the twentieth century, who conceived the law and political institutions
more  as  weapons  for  the  consolidation  and  modernisation  of  the  state  than  as
comprehensive values aimed at guaranteeing the rights of citizens in the face of the
state9.
16 This tradition was long maintained by the Communist Party. In fact, the foundation of
the People's Republic in 1949 allowed this kind of nationalism, officially anti-Confucian
and modernising, but in reality conservative and favourable to the maintenance of a
traditional rural society, to impose itself for over thirty years. The alliance with the
Soviet Union, and then the falling-out between the two countries, led Mao Zedong's
China  to  accept  Western  techniques  and  modes  of  organisation  only  extremely
sparingly, establishing a de facto nationalist isolation which seemed to link up with the
Empire before 1840. While this current of thought is weaker now, it would be wrong to
think that it has disappeared, for it is present within the Communist Party of Deng
Xiaoping,  Jiang Zemin and in particular Hu Jintao,  and helps to explain the Party's
persistent ambiguity towards the West10.
17 A third  current  of  thought  is  based  on what  Yves  Chevrier  calls  “the  modernising
nationalism of the reformist elite”. Its first and principal promoter at the end of the
nineteenth century was probably Kang Youwei, one of the architects of the Hundred
Days reforms. While he favoured the study not only of the techniques but also of the
ideas of the West,  Kang was nevertheless a supporter of a renovated Confucianism.
While  he  hoped,  in  1898,  to  introduce  reforms  in  three  years,  particularly  in  the
institutions, which Meiji Japan had applied over the course of thirty years, he had no
intention of calling into question his country's Confucian legacy, but sought, by means
of  reforms decided on  high,  to  establish  a  utopian  consensus,  the  great  unanimity
(datong). Today one is struck by the similarities between Kang's ideas and plans, and
those  of  Deng  Xiaoping,  Jiang  Zemin  and  Hu  Jintao.  All  three  of  these  leaders  are
unquestionably  modernisers  and  reformers.  However,  the  official  rehabilitation  of
Confucianism over which they presided from 1979 on, their exaltation of traditional
morality  and of  virtue (de),  in the same way as  the “socialist  rule  of  law” and the
protection of human rights, their determination to maintain the leadership role of the
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Communist  Party,  which  they  see  as  the  only  guarantor  of  social  consensus  (in
particular  through  the  theory  of  the  “three  representations”),  betray  a  nationalist
resistance to the globalisation of ideas and to democratisation11. While it is less anti-
Western than previous ones, this form of nationalism seeks nonetheless to contrast the
path  chosen  by  China  with  that  followed  by  the  West.  It  is  therefore  frequently
instrumentalised  in  order  to  reinforce  the  unity  of  society  around  the  political
establishment, and to defend the international interests of the country.
18 Lastly there does exist  in China a form of nationalism that is  broadly pro-Western.
Despite  his  ambiguities,  Yan  Fu  (1852-1921)  is  one  of  the  first  and  the  most
representative of this trend12. Having introduced the most important Western political
thinkers to his compatriots (including John Stuart Mill and Montesquieu), Yan held up
the British parliamentary system as a model for his country. While he influenced the
communists and Mao Zedong in particular, he left his mark above all on the democratic
nationalist tradition embodied by Sun Yat-sen, Hu Shi and Lu Xun. It is true that Yan
Fu, and then Sun Yat-sen felt that they had to move forward prudently and prepare the
people by education, and therefore by what were once again Confucian methods, for
democracy.  Thus  Yan  Fu,  towards  the  end  of  his  life,  gave  his  support  to  the
dictatorship  of  Yuan  Shikai  (1912-1916)  and  Sun  Yat-sen,  after  the  failure  of  the
revolution  in  1911,  conceived  of  the  establishment  of  a  constitutional  government
(xianzheng)  in  three  stages—which  would  have  to  be  preceded  by  a  military
government (junzheng), and then by political control (xunzheng) of the Kuomintang
(KMT) over society.
19 Nevertheless, while it sought to build on those aspects of Chinese tradition that could
favour the modernisation of the country, this form of nationalism was largely inspired
by the West. Sun Yat-sen established, at the beginning of the republican period, the
“three principles of the people”: nationalism (minzuzhuyi), democracy (minquan) and
the  well-being  of  the  people  (minsheng).  He  also  proposed  the  establishment  of
democratically  elected  political  institutions—the  five  Yuan  or  Councils—which
combined the separation of the three powers of the Enlightenment (the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary) with the Chinese administrative tradition (the powers of
examination, stemming from the imperial competitive examinations, and of control,
inspired by the censorship). While his successors, particularly Chang Kai-shek, were for
a while attracted by the Soviet Union's anticolonialism or Germany's militarism, they
turned to the West above all in order to modernise their institutions, their laws, their
economy  and  their  education  system.  As  an  active  participant  in  the  nationalist
movement of the Fourth of May 1919, which is to say the protests of the elites and of
the students against the decision contained in the Treaty of Versailles to transfer to
Japan the former German possessions in China, the Kuomintang largely contributed to
the  dismantling  of  the  concessions,  which  became  definitive  in  1943,  and  more
generally to the reintegration of the Chinese nation among the world's great powers. It
was partly thanks to these efforts that in 1945, at the end of the Second World War and
the  Sino-Japanese  conflict,  China,  with  the  support  of  the  United  States,  became a
permanent member of the UN Security Council.
20 It  is  clear  that,  giving  priority  to  the  strengthening  of  the  central  government  in
Nanking,  which  was  the  capital  of  the  Republic  of  China  from  1928,  and  to  the
subjugation  of  local  potentates  and  of  the  communist  rebellion,  Tchang  Kai-shek
dithered over launching a hopeless counterattack against Japan's territorial violations,
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which allowed Mao and his partisans to appear in the eyes of many Chinese, and above
all of important sections of the Chinese elite, as the only upholders of the nationalist
cause.  Having  taken  refuge  in  Chungking  from  1938  to  1945,  the  Kuomintang
government  largely  abandoned  the  political  territory  of  the  occupied  zones  to  the
Communist Party, which reinforced the identification of the Party with resistance to
the Japanese (and allowed Mao to extend his hold over that part of the country). The
Kuomintang  remained  nevertheless  highly  nationalist,  having  sacrificed  its  best
officers to the defence of Nanking in 1938 and later negotiating inch by inch with the
Allies,  and  particularly  with  the  Americans,  the  return  of  the  Chinese  possessions
which had been snatched by Japan, among them Taiwan (at the Cairo Conference of
1943). The Sino-Japanese war did nevertheless favour the political victory in China in
1949 of the conservative nationalism, totalitarian and with xenophobic tendencies, of
the  Communist  Party  over  the  liberal,  constitutional  and  pro-Western,  if  not  yet
democratic nationalism of the post-war Kuomintang.
21 This historical framework is important because these four main nationalist movements
are still represented in the People's Republic. Thanks to the reforms of 1979, and then
the  clamp-down  which  followed  the  Tian'anmen  massacre  in  1989,  the  respective
influence of these various facets of Chinese nationalism has evolved. But as we shall
see, this evolution is far from over. Because of the slow death of communist ideology
under the successive batterings of the reforms, of the opening-up and of the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the leadership of the Communist Party has been increasingly tempted
since 1989 to instrumentalise the anti-Western and especially anti-Japanese dimensions
of  Chinese  nationalism.  Certain  segments  of  the  Chinese  elites  have  used  this
ideological  movement  to  strengthen either  their  influence  over  the  government  or
their  opposition  to  the  current  system.  The  partial  withdrawal  of  control  over
intellectual  debate  has  favoured  the  reappearance  of  several  competing  forms  of
nationalism, bringing to light once again the fundamentally plural character of this
phenomenon, particularly among the elites.
Nationalism in China today
22 Nationalism  has  always  formed  a  part  of  the  official  discourse  of  the  Chinese
Communist Party. However, for reasons which stem from its ideology and from its links
with the Communist International, it preferred for a long time the idea of “patriotism”
(aiguozhuyi)  which  was  supposed  to  be  more  easily  reconcilable  than  nationalism
properly speaking (which had once been denounced by Mao and his comrades) with the
“proletarian internationalism” which the Party claimed to embrace13. The collapse of
the international communist movement and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union
did not call the idea of patriotism directly into question. The authorities in the People's
Republic still today consider as “patriotic” any Chinese person who shows allegiance to
the state, renders it service and accepts the directives of the Communist Party, whether
they are communist or not.  Thus Peking continues to award this honorary “seal  of
quality”  to  many  overseas  Chinese  who  have  chosen  the  mainland  over  Taiwan.
However,  since  Tian'anmen  and  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  idea  of
nationalism has gradually regained its place in Communist Party discourse, clearing the
way for  the  expression among the  intellectual  elites  of  a  “new nationalism”,  more
populist and autonomous, which, since the mid-1990s, has gone beyond the bounds of
the nationalism set by the Party14. This evolution has led leadership circles in return to
adopt an ambivalent attitude to this trend, hesitating between instrumentalisation and
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control, particularly with the aim of maintaining more margin for manœuvre on the
international level.
The increase in the power of state nationalism after Tian'anmen
23 The increase in the power of nationalism after Tian'anmen has been multidimensional
from the beginning. There was first of all the irruption of a state nationalism which
some dubbed “nationalism of substitution”15,  because to a large extent it replaced a
communist ideology which had shown its futility and above all its inadequacy in the
face of the economic and social realities which the Communist Party was allowing to
take  root  in  China.  Appearing  in  1991,  this  form  of  nationalism  was  part  of  the
transformation of the Communist Party into a Ruling Party (zhizhengdang), offering
daily  proof  of  its  management  abilities  and  presiding  over  the  destiny  of  a  “great
country” (daguo), whose power is to grow irresistibly and thus eventually overtake the
United States.
24 While this state nationalism was, for a period in the 1990s, attracted by “Asian values”,
today it is seeking above all to find in the Chinese Confucian and Imperial tradition the
foundations of a legitimate national territory, of an authoritarian national identity and
of government by virtue or by benevolence (renzheng). On the foreign level, this form
of  nationalism  favours  diplomacy  and  a  security  policy  entirely  based  on  national
interests (guojia liyi), an idea which had been absent from the discourse of the Chinese
Communist Party before, and the reconquest of the Manchu Imperial area (in particular
Taiwan). It is above all more often used by the authorities in Peking, who always seek to
place their partners in a position of inferiority, for example by constantly alluding to
their five millenia of history and culture, or to strengthen their hand in negotiation, by
throwing into the balance the supposed nationalist feelings and even anger of their
compatriots.
25 Having targeted, after Tian'anmen, Western countries as a whole, who were suspected
of  favouring  China's  “peaceful  evolution”  (heping  yanbian)  towards  “bourgeois
democracy”,  this  state  nationalism  then  concentrated  its  attacks  on  two  countries
which are close to China and have a particular interest in the question of Taiwan: the
United States and Japan. The private visit by the Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to
the  United  States  in  1995  unleashed  an  unprecedented  official  offensive  against
Washington centred on the theme of the inevitability of the rebel island's reunification
with the “Mother Country”16. The perspective of the return of Hong Kong (1997) and
Macau (1999) was not foreign to this instrumentalisation of the question of Taiwan.
However,  these  attacks  against  the  United States,  which was  accused of  seeking to
hamper the satisfaction of  China's  legitimate demands,  were part  of  an increase in
bilateral tensions, which were themselves exacerbated by a variety of frictions17.
26 During  the  same  period,  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  intensified  its  criticisms  of
Japan, stigmatising it for a whole range of reasons: on the one hand for its desire to
strengthen  its  security  links  with  the  United  States  (shown  in  particular  by  the
adoption in 1997 of new Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Co-operation and in February
2005 of a declaration which identified Taiwan as a common strategic objective) and to
enhance its relations with Taiwan, and, on the other hand, for its persistent refusal to
present a “sincere apology” for the crimes it committed during the Second World War,
to put an end to the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine where are preserved the funerary
stones of the 2.5 million soldiers killed during the Second World War, among them 14
war criminals, to exercise more control over the publishing of history textbooks with
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revisionist tendencies, and finally, to yield on the question of the Senkaku (Diaoyutai)
archipelago. The presentation by Tokyo of a written apology to Seoul in 1998 was the
occasion for an official offensive by Peking, aimed at obtaining the same commitment
(when a verbal apology had already been made in 1995). However, because Jiang Zemin
did  not  wish  to  promise  to  put  an  end  to  Chinese  criticisms  of  the  Japanese
government's  attitude  to  the  events  connected  with  the  war,  the  latter  refused  to
accede to his demand, provoking, after the failure of Jiang's visit to Japan in 1998, a
further salvo of nationalist attacks from the Chinese Communist Party.
27 Fuelled by certain intellectuals who chose to serve the government after Tian'anmen,
such as He Xin18, this state nationalism has also favoured the irruption of a populist
nationalism whose  most  extreme  manifestations  have  recalled  the  xenophobia  and
anti-Western attitudes  of  the  “primitive  nationalism” at  the  end of  the  nineteenth
century.
A new populist nationalism in China
28 The central place occupied by nationalism in the ideology of the Chinese Communist
Party since 1989 has favoured the expression, particularly among the intellectual elites,
of  an  autonomous  popular  nationalism  with  populist  tendencies,  beginning  in  the
second part of the 1990s, a period marked by the crisis in the Taiwan Strait (1995-1996),
the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (1999) and more recently
the  demonstrations  of  April  2005  against  Japan.  The  adjectives  “popular”,
“autonomous” and “populist” deserve explanation. To what extent does this form of
nationalism reflect the feelings of significant sections of Chinese society? Is it really
autonomous from the state nationalism propagated by the Chinese Communist Party?
In a country where the state tightly controls the media and organised demonstrations,
is not this autonomy inevitably limited and subject to manipulation by the government,
or certain sections of the government? Are the supporters of this form of nationalism
tempted to seek the support of society by criticising what they perceive to be a series of
weaknesses and compromises on the part of the government, and of the official elites,
in the face of the outside world?
29 The  1980s  were  not  without  autonomous  nationalist  movements.  For  example,  the
student demonstrations against the revision of Japanese school textbooks in 1985 were
already aimed at influencing government policy towards Japan (and in fact contributed
to the fall  of Hu Yaobang, a convinced supporter of reconciliation with Tokyo).  But
generally speaking, Chinese society, fascinated by the discovery of the outside world,
was much more bent on learning from the West, envying its prosperity and seeking its
freedom,  than  on  rejecting  it,  distrusting  it  or  criticising  its  dominant  position.
Moreover  debates  on  foreign  policy  were  still  highly  regulated,  restricting  any
autonomous and public participation by society, and above all by the intellectuals, in
them.
30 Things changed gradually after Tian'anmen. It was probably the publication in 1994 of
a book by Wang Shan, a former Red Guard who had become a writer, Looking at China
Through  The  Third  Eye,  which  heralded  the  re-emergence  in  China  of  a  form  of
nationalism and of critical foreign policy discourse which were in fact autonomous and
populist. Worried by the growing gaps in society brought about by the reforms and
nostalgia for the Maoist period, Wang believed that only an autocratic and elitist state
could  allow China  to  remain stable,  to  develop successfully  and to  become a  great
power  again.  In  parallel  he  developed  a  discourse  opposed  to  liberalism,  and  in
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particular to the United States, which he accused of having encouraged and supported
the Beijing Spring of 1989, and of seeking to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party,
because, among other reasons, it possessed nuclear weapons. However, as if to reassure
himself, and following the discourse of state nationalism, he was of the opinion that
America was in decline and that the future belonged to the East19.
31 At the time these opinions were still in a minority among the intellectual elites and
were carried by few publications, apart from a new journal, Strategy and Management
(Zhanlüe yu guanli),  which,  launched at the end of 1993 with the support of  major
leaders in the Communist Party and in the army (among them Generals Xiao Ke and
Zhang Aiping), had begun to develop, in the writings of authors such as Yan Ping and
Wang Xiaodong, a prickly, aggressive and populist nationalism.
32 It was the crisis in the Taiwan Strait which probably contributed the most to the rise of
populist  nationalism in Chinese society.  By 1994-1995,  several  opinion polls  showed
obvious popular support for a pro-active and aggressive policy of reunification with
Taiwan and a clear increase in anti-American feelings among young Chinese. Carried
out  in  a  closed  society  where  outside  viewpoints  are  systematically  distorted  or
censored, these polls produced results that are clearly questionable. They nevertheless
directly inspired a number of nationalist books published after 1996, of which the best-
known was China Can Say No (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu). Written by young intellectuals
(Qiao Bian, Zhang Zangzang and Song Qiang) based on the model of Japan Can Say No
by the far-right member of  parliament Shinaro Ishihara,  this book was followed by
many others which, often for primarily commercial reasons, sought to exploit this new
“seam”.
33 These intellectuals had managed to pick up the feelings of a fairly substantial part of
public opinion and to systematise them into a discourse which, without contradicting
that  of  the  Party,  went  beyond  it.  Nevertheless  these  nationalist  tracts,  which
demonised the United States, were produced by a relatively small elite. Most of the
authors were young intellectuals who were brought together in what the Chinese press
then called “The No Club” (shuo bu julebu), with about ten members. Among them at
the time were Liu Kang and Li Xiguang who, in December 1996, published Behind The
Scenes  of  The  Demonisation  of  China  (Yaomohua  Zhongguo  de  beihou),  a  vitriolic
denunciation of the American media20.
34 The outrageous statements, the idea of a Western, and particularly an American plot
aimed at preventing China from developing itself and thus becoming stronger, as well
as the determination—and the certainty—displayed to raise China to the rank of most
powerful nation in the world and thus to put an end to American hegemony, all these
themes expressed,  within the Chinese elites,  both a  growing awareness  and a  deep
feeling  of  insecurity.  An  awareness,  related  to  the  1980s,  that  the  West  could  not
provide all the answers to China's problems, and a feeling of insecurity in the face of
foreign criticism of their country, and especially the dangers of economic failure or of
social instability which they criticisms alluded to.
35 Fascinated  by  Western  success  during  the  first  decade  after  opening  up,  these
intellectuals were now tempted to perceive in the West, if not always the cause of their
ills, at least the main obstacle to the realisation of their country's destiny as a great
power.  This is  why,  worried by the implications of  the globalisation of  the Chinese
economy, they were often hostile to China's accession to the World Trade Organisation
(WTO),  and  critical  of  the  supposed  weakness  of  their  government  during  the
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negotiations.  Lastly,  they developed the  idea  that  because  of  the  antiquity  of  their
civilisation, the greatness of their culture, and the intrinsic qualities of the “Chinese
race” (hanzu), their country could legitimately claim the first rank in the world which
the Americans, whose culture was constantly presented as young and superficial, had
usurped by taking advantage of China's temporary weakness. It was thus a question for
China, by rising above the United States, of washing away the humiliation inflicted by
the West (and Japan) from 1840 onwards.
36 One can obviously see in this discourse the direct influence of the domestic communist
propaganda that can be found, for example, in school textbooks. This has always more
accurately reflected the position of  the Communist  Party leadership than the more
civilised discourse that it broadcasts on the international scene, and is moulded by a
deep feeling of superiority (which classically conceals an obvious feeling of inferiority).
The same is true of the nationalism propagated within the armed forces, some studies
of  which  have  revealed  its  deeply  anti-American  and  anti-Japanese  character21.
Nonetheless,  nationalist  intellectuals  developed  anti-American,  anti-Japanese,  anti-
WTO,  and  sometimes  racist  ideas  that  manifestly  went  beyond  even  the  internal
discourse of the Peking authorities. It is true that the authorities allowed these theses
to  be  published and broadcast.  In  this  sense,  one cannot  help  suspecting a  certain
collusion  or,  as  we  said  earlier,  a  temptation  to  instrumentalise  this  extremist
discourse, which allows the Chinese government to appear in the eyes of the world as
supporting a moderate, tolerant, or so to speak “centrist” form of nationalism. The fact
remains that Wang Xiaodong, Song Qiang and others like them developed from this
period onwards an autonomous strategy and position which largely contributed to the
spontaneous demonstrations in May 1999, protesting against the accidental bombing of
China's  embassy  in  Belgrade  by  NATO forces,  and to  the  violent  and probably  less
spontaneous demonstrations in April 2005 against Japan22.
The demonstrations in May 1999: a turning point in Chinese nationalism?
37 Much has been said and written about these demonstrations. With hindsight, one can
first of all state that there was then a very clear convergence between the position of
the  government  and  the  feelings  expressed  in  the  streets.  The  reasons  for  this
encounter were, however, far from being identical. On one side the Chinese Communist
Party reacted all the more strongly to the bombing because it had taken sides with the
Yugoslav regime of Milosevic which it supported militarily, and had opposed the NATO
airstrikes against Serbia. Consequently, it deliberately kept its citizens ignorant of the
human  tragedy  in  Kosovo. Moreover,  certain  sections  of  society  that  were  already
“wound  up”  against  the  United  States,  saw  in  the  bombing  a  deliberate  desire  to
“humiliate” China. The outcome of this convergence was the inability of most Chinese
to believe in the hypothesis of an accident, a hypothesis that their government also
strongly denounced (and subsequently never accepted). Moreover the government was
late publishing the official apologies given by the Clinton administration and by NATO,
which,  as  soon as they were received,  were called into question and considered by
many demonstrators to be “lacking in sincerity”.
38 In  any  case,  this  protest  movement  also  constituted  a  turning  point  in  nationalist
expression  in  China,  and  in  relations  between  the state  and  society.  Firstly,  this
movement  developed  independently,  giving  rise  to  violence,  which  having  been
tolerated, was partly controlled in Peking, and much less so in Chengdu, where the
American  Consulate  was  burned  to  the  ground.  For  about  two  weeks,  the  many
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foreigners resident in China were advised to reduce as much as possible their contacts
with a local population which was galvanised against the Americans, and Westerners
more generally. Hu Jintao, then the regime's second-in-command, was given the task of
asking the demonstrators  to  put  an end to  their  movement,  apparently  convincing
them that the best way to avoid other “humiliations” was to work hard and contribute
to the development and thus to the strengthening of their country. This was not a risk-
free strategy, but it was successful in calming things down.
39 Secondly, the leaders of this movement mostly came from the universities, showing
once more to what extent Chinese nationalism had become (once again) a weapon that
allowed the elites and the future elites (the students) to express themselves and to
influence the government. Moreover this movement shed light on the deeply emotional
character  of  Chinese  nationalism.  Rather  than  expressing  itself  through  constant
pressure on the authorities or on foreigners, it manifests itself through moments of
intense mobilisation, which can lead to surges of anti-Western violence. In 1999, there
were no foreign casualties. But one cannot exclude such a possibility in the future, so
punctuated  is  the  history  of  Chinese  nationalism,  in  its  populist  and primitive
dimension, with aggression against foreigners. The anti-Japanese violence perpetrated
over the last few years, and particularly during the demonstrations in the spring of
2005, have shown that such an evolution remains possible.
40 At the same time, the excesses of this movement led to important divisions among
Chinese  nationalists.  On  the  one  hand  these  excesses  brought  the  writers  of
popularising tracts closer to the best-known nationalist intellectuals of the “New Left”,
as well as to conservative Communist Party leaders opposed to China's accession to the
WTO.  Moreover  the  demonstrations  in  May  1999  gave  them  an  opportunity  to
denounce the supposed concessions made by Zhu Rongji on the question during his
journey to the United States the previous month. Fang Ning and Wang Xiaodong, the
two main organisers of the opinion polls in 1994-1995, wrote with Song Qiang, one of
the authors of China Can Say No, an equally anti-American sequel to that book, entitled
China's Path in the Shadow of Globalisation (Quanqiu yinying xia de Zhongguo zhi lu).
Published in November 1999,  the book received the explicit  support  of  Yu Quanyu,
former Vice-President of the Chinese Human Rights Commission, directed by the arch-
conservative  Zhu  Muzhi.  On  the  other  hand,  the  increasing  power  of  populist
nationalism worried certain intellectuals who had initially perceived in it a stabilising
factor. In 1998, the journal Strategy and Management excluded Wang Xiaodong from its
list of contributors. The events of 1999 furthered this development. For example, these
events  led  Xiao  Gonqin,  an  intellectual  described  as  a  neo-conservative  during  the
1990s, but in reality fairly liberal although a nationalist, to denounce the extremism
and the emotional and destabilising character of this new movement, in his eyes the
source of the failure of numerous reforms in China (including those of Kang Youwei)23.
41 Finally the nationalist mobilisation in May 1999 was a lesson for the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party, or at least for some of them. Having for ten years nourished
and fed the nationalist feelings of society, the government in Peking realised that these
were getting out of control and could not only reduce its margin for manœuvre in
international matters, but eventually destabilise it. This is the reason why, after 1999,
while not overtly suppressing “populist nationalism”, the Chinese authorities sought
for  several  years  to  direct  it,  gradually  toning  down,  particularly  from  2000-2001
onwards, a foreign policy strategy which had done more to build the perception of a
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Chinese menace,  particularly  in the United States  and in Japan,  than to satisfy  the
demands  of  the  populist  nationalists.  In  this  respect  9/11  made  the  Chinese
government's task easier. But the latter's attitude towards nationalism has remained
deeply ambivalent, so central is this ideology to the survival of the present regime.
Thus the relative prudence advocated by Jiang Zemin after the demonstrations in 1999
was clearly called into question by Hu Jintao in the spring of 2005.
The anti-Japanese demonstrations in the spring of 2005
42 The anti-Japanese mobilisation in the spring of  2005 was of  a  kind that  set  certain
limits, probably temporary but nonetheless real, to the emergence of any autonomous
nationalist  movement  in  the  People's  Republic.  The  question  here  is  not  to  pass
judgement on the moral grounds for the Chinese movement of protest against the visits
paid  by  the  Japanese  Prime  Minister  to  Yasukuni,  or  against  the  approval  by  the
Minister of Education of school textbooks with revisionist tendencies:  both of these
problems, which give rise to equally negative reactions in South Korea for example,
show beyond a doubt the massive ambiguity of the Japanese Right towards the period
of the war. Neither is it to disregard the general context of the rise in anti-Japanese
feeling within Chinese society, nourished from a tender age by the education system
and by government propaganda but also connected with China's emergence onto the
world scene and marked by numerous incidents over the last few years. The physical
and verbal violence that surrounded the football matches between China and Japan,
held in Chengdu and in Peking in the course of the Asian Cup during the summer of
2004, were a striking illustration of this.
43 Nevertheless,  the  dialectic  between,  on  the  one  hand the  mobilisation  observed  in
China from March 2005, and on the other, the Peking government's offensive against a
number  of  Japanese  initiatives  is  too  close  to  believe  that  the  latter  did  not
instrumentalise the former, and was very likely at its origin.
44 Indeed, what unleashed the Chinese Communist Party's campaign against Tokyo was
the joint American and Japanese declaration on February 19th 2005 on security in the
Far  East,  in  which,  among  the  many  shared  strategic  objectives  on  display,  there
appeared the peaceful  settlement of  the question of  Taiwan.  Although insignificant
because  it  added  hardly  any  substance  to  previous  commitments,  this  declaration
nonetheless  appeared  at  a  difficult  time,  marked  in  particular  by  clearer  military
rivalry between China and Japan (sharpened by the intrusion of a Chinese submarine in
Japanese territorial waters in November 2004), the lack of summit meetings between
the two countries, because of Prime Minister Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni, and
dissension over the underwater gas deposits at Chunxiao, which lie in an area which is
claimed by both countries.
45 In this context, the petition against Japan's candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN
Security  Council,  which  was  launched  at  the  end  of  February  by  the  “Alliance  to
preserve the truth about the Sino-Japanese war”, based in the United States, and then
taken  up  by  several  Chinese  websites  which  are  tightly  controlled  by  the  Chinese
government, could seem somewhat suspicious24. Although there is no tangible evidence
that the authorities in Peking played any part in this initiative, the role they play in
manipulating the debates taking place on the Internet unavoidably casts doubts on the
spontaneity  of  this  campaign25.  This  petition  was  enormously  successful,  with  22
million electronically-collected signatures within a month, and 40 million by the end of
April26. Shortly after, in early March, two books by the liberal author Yu Jie, including
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The Iron and the Plough, which exhorted his compatriots to find out more about Japan
before “hating” it, were withdrawn from the bookshops27.
46 A month later, at the beginning of April, several demonstrations broke out in various
cities in China, denouncing both Japan's candidacy for the UN Security Council and its
general attitude to its own past, particularly the approval by the Japanese Ministry of
Education of a school textbook (which was distributed to 0.1% of pupils) which plays
down the massacres committed in China during the war, and the visits to Yasukuni.
China's claim over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) islands was also brought up. First organised
in Chengdu and Shenzhen on April 5th, these demonstrations reached Peking on April
9th, and then Shanghai on April 16th. In Peking, and especially in Shanghai, verbal and
physical violence was committed against Japanese representations with the permission
of  the Chinese authorities,  and,  even in Shanghai,  against  shops that  sold Japanese
products  and  several  Japanese  people,  without  the  police  showing  any  clear
determination  to  prevent  these  people  from  being  beaten  up28.  The  verbally  and
physically destructive excesses which took place in Shanghai led the Communist Party
leadership to bring a halt to the demonstrations it had allowed to go ahead, revealing
its power to suddenly muzzle a nationalist movement which one might have thought
had acquired a certain autonomy.
47 Admittedly,  the  authorities  in  Peking,  while  refusing  to  present  an  apology  to  the
government in Tokyo for the damage caused to its embassy and consulates in China,
decided  under  the  pressure  of  international  reaction—particularly  Japanese—to
prosecute  those  who  had  committed  the  violence,  and  to  pay  for  repairs  to  the
damaged buildings (at least in Shanghai).  But information received after the events
makes it possible to think that Public Security and the Communist Youth League, in
other words the government, played a decisive role in setting off and organising the
April  demonstrations.  Those  responsible  for  these  demonstrations  were  not  the
spontaneous representatives of an autonomous civil society, but the cadres of those
organisations.  Those  who  participated  belonged  either  to  the  student  community,
which is to say the future elite of the country, or to the new educated middle classes,
such as those that now live around Zhongguancun, the new business district located
near  the  capital's  universities29.  A  final  point  is  that  these  demonstrations  brought
together  a  fairly  limited number of  participants  (between 10,000 and 20,000),  for  a
country supposedly unanimously hostile to Japan. The order given on April 19th by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Li Zhaoxing, to stop the movement, was meekly obeyed by
these temporary demonstrators and the boycott against Japanese products they had
launched fizzled quickly away. In a way the failure of this campaign showed how little
it  was “popular” and above all  how unrealistic,  in a country whose trade with the
nation which is the target of its invective reached 168 billion dollars in 2004, ranking it
second among China's trading partners, after the United States (with 252 billion dollars
according to American statistics).
48 One might well consider however, that the temptation for Hu Jintao and the present
authorities in China to brandish the nationalist weapon and to manipulate society for
reasons of foreign policy, in this case with the aim of preventing Japan from rising to
the status of Asian Great Power, has not been without its dangers. It has revealed an
unappealing and rather undemocratic  facet  of  Chinese society,  and especially of  its
rising elites, who did not hesitate to resort to racist slogans (comparing the Japanese to
pigs,  for  example)  and  physical  violence  in  order  to  advance  their  cause.  This
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temptation  also  allowed  other,  more  anti-authoritarian  forces,  to  interfere  in  the
movement,  particularly  in  Shanghai,  revealing  the  potential  for  anti-government
protest that exists in China.
49 The loss of control of the movement probably explains the editorial published in the
paper Jiefang ribao (Liberation), Shanghai's official daily, which claimed to perceive a
“plot” in the anti-Japanese demonstrations rather than a patriotic movement30.  The
renewed  instrumentalisation  of  nationalism  decided  on  by  Hu  Jintao  also  caused
dissension within the Communist Party leadership. The article in Jiefang ribao was also
a virtually transparent denunciation of Hu's strategy and of its deplorable effects on
social and political stability, and on the business environment, particularly in a city
where  Japanese  economic  presence  is  very  strong.  This  is  why the  article  was  not
reprinted in the national press and, according to outside sources, why the leaders in
Shanghai were scathingly criticised for having allowed it to be published31.
50 Hu's strategy also turned its back on several years of efforts by Chinese specialists on
Japan (Ma Licheng, Shi Yinhong, Lu Zhongwei, etc.) to convince their government to
improve relations with this important partner, which is also strongly nationalist, and
less willing nowadays to yield to the pressures of its former victims, and whose regional
ambitions, as these experts see it, will have to be taken into account in one way or
another32.
51 However, this episode showed how useful nationalism is to the government, both in
order to legitimise its domination over society and to further its interests on the
international  scene,  and  particularly  in  its  regional  environment,  even  if  it  means
fuelling the syndrome of a Chinese menace in Japan and a negative image abroad. It
also showed the limitations of the emergence of an autonomous populist nationalism
whose existence no longer needs to be demonstrated but whose propensity for being
manipulated by the government has also been proved. 
Chinese nationalism and the new dialectic between the state and society
52 Since  1999  a  complex  interaction  has  appeared  between  government  and  society
around  the  question  of  nationalism.  Today  the  discussions  about  the  theme  of
nationalism go far beyond international questions and tend to concern the legitimacy
of the political regime and its ability to raise China to the rank of Number One World
Power, however much this ambition may be a dream. Since the end of the 1990s, the
growth of electronic communications and forums has favoured wider expression by
society on political matters and particularly on nationalism33. Certain fora specialise in
nationalist  diatribes  (such  as  Qiangguo  [Strong  Country],  or  Jianchuan  zhishi
[Knowledge of Warships]). These fora are tolerated, particularly because of the support
they receive from certain leadership circles, but they are also used by the authorities,
since they are seen as polls on the opinions of society and particularly on the opinions
of the educated population with Internet access (there were about 100 million Internet
users in 2005). However, the Chinese Communist Party remains particularly vigilant
over the subversive uses some might be tempted to make of nationalist sentiment.
Nationalism and foreign policy
53 Today, questions of foreign policy are debated by a much larger number of Chinese,
particularly  in  discussion forums and in  intellectual  journals,  such as  Strategy  and
Management, which was banned during the summer of 2004 for having published an
iconoclastic article on the question of North Korea's nuclear programme34.
The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism
China Perspectives, 59 | may - june 2005
15
54 This episode also highlights a greater diversification of opinion on foreign policy. In
other  words,  even  among  the  fora  and  journals  that  have  served  as  carriers  of
nationalist ideas, these are far from dominating all the debates. On the contrary, some
research tends to show that the emergence of an urban middle class has contributed to
the moderation of society's nationalist sentiment35. The internationalisation of China
and of its modes of consumption is doubtless not unconnected to this evolution.
55 Having said that, the Chinese government remains strongly tempted to instrumentalise
nationalism, and particularly its populist component, above all where its relations with
the United States and Japan are concerned.
56 Where the former is concerned, Taiwan continues to occupy an important place. More
generally,  the strategic role played by the United States in Eastern Asia and in the
world, as well as its determination, perceived as imperial, to export its political system,
its values and its mass culture, are the targets of denunciation by the Communist Party
and by  the  nationalist  sections  of  the  intellectual  elites  which  continue  to  irrigate
Chinese society. It is a similar case with perception of Japan, which remains largely in
thrall to trends from a past that is long gone. Thus the Chinese government persists in
placing at the centre of bilateral relations the problems connected with the war, with
the apologies and with the Yasukuni Shrine, even going so far as to mobilise the man in
the street against the Japanese government.
57 Thus,  Peking's  policies  towards  America,  Taiwan  and  Japan  have  become  largely
dependent on a “public opinion” which is manipulated by the most nationalist political
and intellectual elites, and sometimes by the leadership of the Communist Party. The
government uses it to strengthen its hand in its relations with Washington, Taipei and
Tokyo. But it also finds itself constrained to use cunning and to conceal any flexibility
under  an  intransigent  and  even  aggressive  discourse  when  it  decides  to  reach a
compromise.
58 The  attraction  of  the  United  States  for  many  Chinese,  and  the  importance  of  the
economic  and  human  exchanges  with  Japan  can  be  helpful  for  those  within  the
government who strive to maintain the stability of these bilateral relations, both of
which are essential to China36. But nationalist pressure is likely to remain strong, and in
conjunction with the temptation to instrumentalise it which is often present in official
circles,  will  continue to  influence  China's  foreign policy  as  a  whole,  including that
towards neighbouring countries such as Russia, India or Vietnam, with which border
problems  have  not  been  completely  settled,  or  even  towards  the  European  Union,
which still refuses to grant China the status of a market economy and sometimes raises
its voice in protest against the most visible human rights violations in that country.
Nationalism and the stability of the regime
59 Chinese nationalists have often proclaimed that: “If Taiwan declares independence and
the Communist Party does nothing, we will overthrow it!” This provocative statement
sheds light on the link that has always existed in China between the legitimacy of a
government and its ability to defend the fundamental national interests of the country.
And in the eyes of the majority of mainland Chinese, or at least of the elites who have
the right to speak in their name, the question of Taiwan is part of those fundamental
interests.
60 This relationship has led some reformers who favour the establishment of a democratic
regime in China to also claim to be nationalists.  This is particularly the case of Wu
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Guoguang,  now  a  Professor  at  the  University  of  Victoria  in  Canada,  and  of  Ding
Xueliang, a Professor at the Science and Technology University of Hong Kong. One can
perceive behind this  strategy a desire to avoid allowing nationalism to become the
monopoly of conservative forces close to the Communist Party. This approach, which
has been criticised by some Chinese reformers and democrats, such as Ma Licheng, a
former  journalist  with  the  People's  Daily,  and  Chen  Yang,  a  journalist  with  Radio
France International, because they see it as “killing freedom” and as being a source of
tensions with the outside world, cannot be easily brushed aside37. This is also the reason
why others  theorists  of  an  exit  from authoritarianism,  such  as  Zheng  Yongnian,  a
Researcher  at  the  University  of  Nottingham,  seek  to  construct  a  “democratic
nationalism” in opposition to the “ethnic nationalism” of the populist movement38.
61 But one can appreciate the difficulty of such an undertaking, so easily can the debates
about nationalism be taken over  by the country's  most  xenophobic  and demagogic
powers.
62 All in all, Chinese nationalism constitutes a more complex ideology than might appear
at first glance. In fact, both within the Communist Party and in society, the various
forms of nationalism examined here still exist, and will probably continue to cohabit in
future. Associated with the Cultural Revolution, which was still very present in people's
minds, populist nationalism was little in evidence in the 1980s. In contrast, from the
middle of the following decade, its influence grew rapidly, concentrating its attacks on
the United States and on Japan. Since it expresses a feeling of insecurity in the face of
richer  and more  powerful  countries,  could  this  form of  nationalism not  decline  as
China sees its own power grow and its standard of living improve? Possibly. But for all
that one cannot rule out the Party leaders and certain intellectuals of the New Left
being tempted in the future, for political ends, to hive off into extreme nationalism the
reservoir of frustration and discontent contained in Chinese society. Having said that,
and despite the anti-Japanese demonstrations in April 2005, this form of nationalism is
today less perceptible within Chinese society, and even among the elite as a whole,
which is perhaps a sign of a positive development. Is this to say that the globalisation of
the economy and society in China have already contributed to marginalising this trend
of thought? Or is this decline to be attributed to the increase in “face” (mianzi), capable
of  washing  away  past  “humiliations”,  that  the  country's  economic  successes  have
provided to society?
63 The game is not yet won, so loaded is the process with jolts and even social crises.
Pandering to the nationalism in society while marginalising its populist and aggressive
corruptions,  “the path of peaceful emergence” advocated by Hu Jintao in 2004, had
precisely the aim of reassuring China's partners, and avoiding the trap which pre-war
Germany and Japan fell into. But the anti-Japanese violence which the same Hu Jintao
tolerated in April 2005 showed that the Communist Party remains in part a prisoner of
its old demons. The future of Chinese nationalism will depend heavily on the Chinese
elites and their ability to give society an image that is both independent and accurate,
of the intentions of their country's main partners. There is no doubt that much will also
depend on the way in which these partners  manage this  nationalism, and,  without
acceding  to  its  unreasonable  demands,  find  ways  to  provide  it  with  balanced  and
persuasive answers. One obviously thinks of Japan, which has not managed to come to
terms  completely  with  its  past.  Lastly,  much  will  also  depend  on  the  Chinese
authorities,  and  their  ability  to  embark  on  real  political  reform.  Only  a  genuine
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diversification  of  the  Chinese  political  system  will  be  capable  of  guaranteeing  the
reconciliation  of  Chinese  society  with  its  own  history,  independent  access  to
information about the outside world, the marginalisation of populist nationalism and
thus  the  irruption  of  a  tolerant  and  democratic  nationalism into  Chinese  society,
which, reviving Yan Fu, Sun Yat-sen and Hu Shi, will find ways to co-exist smoothly
with  the  other  nationalisms  which  the  world,  and  particularly  East  Asia,  have
produced. As such an evolution remains unlikely in the foreseeable future, we have no
choice but to remain vigilant and attentive to the various manifestations of Chinese
nationalism. 
64 Translated from the French original by Michael Black
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RÉSUMÉS
While, for historical reasons, Chinese nationalism is in many ways specific, it has expressed, since
the beginning of the modern era, which is to say since the Opium War of 1840, the profound
insecurity  of  the  Chinese  elite.  However,  behind  this  feeling  of  insecurity,  several  forms  of
nationalism co-exist: an official nationalism inspired by communist ideology and the Communist
Party's  preoccupation  with  maintaining  its  monopoly  of  politics,  which  is  similar  to  the
modernising but authoritarian nationalism of many Chinese revolutionaries at the beginning of
the twentieth century; a “primitive” and revanchist nationalism with racist tendencies, which is
disseminated  in  society  by  the  most  xenophobic  elements  among  the  Chinese  elite;  and  a
“pragmatic nationalism” which derives its legitimacy from the economic and social realities of
China,  without  however  rejecting  foreign  influence  out  of  hand.  Can  this  latter  nationalism
eventually give birth to a democratic nationalism, at once measured, open, and concerned with
defending not only the interests of the Chinese nation, but also those of the men and women who
belong to it? The anti-American demonstrations in 1999 and the anti-Japanese violence in the
spring of 2005 highlight the difficulty of such an evolution, as well as the persistent temptation
for the Chinese government to instrumentalise the only ideology that allows it to prolong its life
expectancy.
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